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Summary 
The ouster of Lucio Gutiérrez and the election of Rafael Correa were not just the political highlights 
of 2005 and 2006 in Ecuador, but also the main factors that triggered what has happened since then 
and probably the ones that will determine what occurs in the future. Although a President’s term in 
office coming to an abrupt end is no longer unusual in that Andean country, the way it happened 
this time and the events that led to it do oblige one to study it in detail. And while the election of an 
outsider is not news in Ecuador either, there are a series of factors that make this case special. So 
this, too, requires careful analysis. 
 
This paper examines the most important political events in Ecuador in the past two years –in light 
of the departure of Gutiérrez and the election of Rafael Correa– and gives some general 
explanations of them. On this basis the paper seeks to offer longer-term explanations of the causes 
of the constant instability in Ecuadorean politics. 
 
Introduction 
One widely held opinion on the political situation in Ecuador over the past two years is that a crisis 
that began more than a decade ago has deepened. The clearest backing for his argument is the fact 
that the last three elected Presidents have seen their terms in office brought to a sudden end. And 
many of the people who express this opinion do not hesitate to point out other circumstances that 
are just as important. These include an erosion of institutions –expressed in their only fledgling 
capacity to process social and political conflicts through dialogue– a heightening of conflicts over 
regional and ethnic differences, the decline of political parties which have dominated the national 
political scene since the first years after the transition to democracy and above all growing hostility 
among the population towards politicians and politics in general. All of this has led to a situation of 
polarisation characterised by the presence of political forces that cannot –and do not even try– to 
reach agreements and consensus. It has also yielded a constant search for strong leadership capable 
of finding solutions that are immediate, effective and lasting. 
 
Surprisingly, these political conditions have not spread to the economic realm, or at least they have 
not done so as intensely as they might have. To the contrary, the macroeconomic indicators of the 
last five years have been the best since the oil boom of the 1970s and make for upbeat situation 
unheard of in Ecuador’s recent history. After the crash of the financial sector in 1999 –one of its 
effects was massive migration to Spain and other countries– there came a period of sustained 
growth that shows up not only in a rise in per capita GDP but also a reduction in poverty. Thus, 
unlike what is generally stated and unlike what had constantly been the case until now, the 
economy has managed to skirt the negative influence of political instability, at least partially. But 
precisely because of the exceptional nature of these links between politics and economics, 
reasonable doubts have emerged as to whether they will be able to survive, especially since the 
government that took power in January 2007 campaigned on promises of radical change in both 
areas. 
 
The Ouster of Lucio Gutiérrez 
 
The year 2005 began in the midst of what can be called the gravest political problem in Ecuador 
since the return of democracy. In December of the previous year, a legislative majority loyal to the 
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government of Lucio Gutiérrez fired and replaced the members of the Supreme Court of Justice, the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The move went against all legal and 
constitutional norms. No intervention of this degree had occurred before, even in the most turbulent 
periods of previous governments, even those of the Presidents forced to end their terms in office 
ahead of schedule. There was no denying that one branch of power had intervened in the affairs of 
another and thus broken the constitutional order. Therefore, it was not going to be easy to arrive at a 
solution based on self-interest, as was the case in the earlier episodes that ended with the ouster of a 
President. The magnitude of the problem and above all the fact that the main players were the 
government and the legislative majority placed it in uncharted ground. 
 
Also unprecedented was the citizens’ reaction to these events. From the instant the resolutions taken 
in Congress became known, protagonism shifted to the political parties and social organisations and 
to certain ad hoc citizen groups that formed precisely because of this crisis. Social and political 
mobilisation was a prominent feature of the 1980s and was usually driven by economic and social 
issues. But this time it was a purely political dispute that sent people pouring into the streets to 
express their anger day after day, and in the news media and a wide variety of forums in their day-
to-day lives. It is surprising that a society which is not particularly attached to democratic values 
and procedures (as seen repeatedly in public opinion polls and as Ecuadoreans show with their own 
actions) mobilised in defence of precisely these same values. Demands for a return to the rule of 
law were the unifying element of a mass mobilisation that concluded with the ouster of the 
President in April 2005. 
 
It is not easy to explain this radical shift in orientation of major segments of Ecuadorean society. It 
was a change that transformed them into guarantors of a system to which, until then, they had been 
indifferent at most. It is possible that deep down inside people felt legitimate fear over the potential 
loss of freedoms and rights. But it is also likely that the political context in which the events 
unfolded had a decisive influence. Indeed, there is no denying that many sectors of society took to 
the streets because they saw signs that a dictatorship grabbing all powers was taking shape. The 
concerted action of the executive and legislative branches pointed clearly in that direction, and it 
had the support of violent groups in the streets. At the same time, clear signs emerged of 
persecution of opposition figures and critics, both from political parties and social organisations. 
Therefore, along with a positive change towards supporting democracy and the adoption of its 
values, underlying this citizen mobilisation there seemed to be a pragmatic calculation of what 
suited individuals and groups. The situation taking shape tended to eliminate conditions which until 
then had been favourable for those social sectors to express themselves and mobilise. This was 
clearly becoming intolerable from the point of view of their specific interests, not just in terms of 
values. 
 
It is also probable that the decline of political parties and the erosion of politics in general had an 
effect. The events of December 2004 were just another link in a chain of irregularities that made 
politics look like something that always degenerated into conflict and did not produce anything 
positive. People’s perceptions showed this repeatedly. In public opinion polls they gave extremely 
low ratings to political parties, the National Congress and many of the leaders they had elected 
through the same political system. In those conditions, what the legislative majority and the 
President of the Republic did could easily be interpreted as just another of these deeds done out of 
self-interest and something seen as coming from a clique within the circle of power. At the same 
time there was a generalised suspicion that what lay behind all this were secretive interests covering 
up acts of corruption. For a long time politicians and politics had been associated with corruption 
and it was impossible at a time like this that the events were not seen through that prism. 
 
Whatever the cause may have been, the truth is that the citizens’ protest ended up cornering a 
government that was losing social and political power day-by-day. From January to April of 2005, 
hardly a day went by in which there was not a demonstration. With time, they were designed not 
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just to denounce the replacement of the Supreme Court of Justice and other organs but also to 
repudiate the government that had carried out these actions. Demands that initially called for a 
review of the decisions made quickly transformed into appeals for the resignation or firing of the 
President of the Republic. In reality, because of the way the situation evolved, there was no room 
for an arrangement based on an agreement among the various parties involved, and this took the 
crisis into territory calling for extreme solutions. 
 
A key element in arriving at this juncture was the loss of protagonism of the political parties and 
even the ever-active social organisations. In the first days of the crisis the parties channelled 
protests through the framework of congress. But the parties were quickly replaced by heterogeneous 
sets of people who, as quickly as they organised themselves to express their rejection of what had 
happened, disappeared from the public spotlight. There was no stable organisation or game plan to 
guide these groups, composed mainly of people from the Quito middle class. In January and 
February, local authorities in Quito and Guayaquil convened what they called citizen assemblies. 
These harked back to the old open-forum ‘cabildo’ gatherings of the colonial era and were supposed 
to become forums for reflection, debate and decision-making on this specific issue at hand. The 
idea was to give direction and coherence to the citizen protest. But even though the mayors of both 
cities were widely liked –this set them apart from the generalised scorn which the political class 
suffered– these attempts at organising the protests failed. All attempts to manage the protests went 
nowhere, and from that point on Ecuadorean society went its own way. 
 
Unlike earlier cases, in which the unifying element was anger over the government’s handling of 
the economy (in the ouster of Mahuad) or over corruption (in the fall of Bucaram), the driving force 
behind these manifestations of popular discontent was opposition to what was seen as a one-way 
road to dictatorship. As stated above, this was the first time since the return of democracy in 1979 
that Ecuador had seen demonstrations with this kind of demand. At the same time, these protests 
(specialists in social movements would call them repertoires of collective action) took shape in new 
and creative ways and were always peaceful. Even when faced with attempts by the government to 
organise counter-demonstrations and with the action of violent groups, the protesters remained 
peaceful, and thus won the support of broad sectors of society. Therefore, this was an 
unprecedented situation in Ecuador, clearly different from other ousters of governments, not just in 
terms of the motivation but also the way it took place and the social sectors which rose up in anger. 
This time it was clearly the aforementioned Quito middle-class which took the lead, with the 
noteworthy absence of indigenous peoples who spearheaded the coup against Jamil Mahuad and the 
organised social sectors who played the main role in the overthrow of Abdalá Bucaram. 
 
Still, the course of events was similar to previous political crises. When the situation became 
untenable, and mainly when it became clear that violence could break out in the streets, the military 
withdrew its support from Gutiérrez and at the same time congress dismissed him on the grounds 
that he had abandoned his position. With the two previous Presidents similar methods were used, so 
we can say the three crises were resolved –if in fact one can speak of resolution– with the pretext of 
preserving the constitutional order. 
 
It is worth pointing out that Lucio Gutiérrez came to power as an alternative to political parties that 
were considered traditional. He led a coalition that included the indigenous party Pachakutik, as 
well as the Socialist Party and the Popular Democratic Movement, both of which were leftist, and 
the Patriotic Society Party, the party Gutiérrez had formed in order to register to run in the election. 
But the coalition fell apart just six months into his term and the President ended up leading a 
minority government, with just 5% of the seats in the legislature, the ones held by his party. To deal 
with this he developed a strategy of rolling majorities; in other words he struck makeshift, 
temporary alliances with a variety of parties. This led to constant instability and thus difficulty in 
getting government-sponsored legislation approved. It was precisely one of those transient 
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majorities that took the decisions that led to President Gutiérrez’s downfall and, given its transient 
nature, could not support him when the protests broke out. 
 
The Election of Rafael Correa 
 
The fiction of preserving the constitutional order was expressed by having Vice-president Alfredo 
Palacio, elected along with Gutiérrez, take over as President. The Vice-president should therefore 
simply serve out the established term, in this case the 18 months that remained of Gutiérrez’s term. 
However, imbued with the spirit of the movimiento forajido (outlaw movement, the name that the 
protesters gave themselves when Gutiérrez referred to them this way), the new leader tried to 
embark on a profound process of political reform. His goal was to overhaul the country, as he stated 
right after taking power in the midst of a chaotic situation. But the weakness of his government, the 
disbanding of the groups which had brought down the President and the lack of interest and even 
outright opposition from political parties doomed all his initiatives to this end. Still, the issue 
became part of the national political agenda, even if just in a latent way. Ecuadoreans even began 
talking about the need to convene a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution as the proper 
tool to carry out such reforms. 
 
One of the members of Alfredo Palacio’s cabinet, the Finance Minister, was a young economist 
with an academic background whose public presence was limited to whatever opinion he expressed 
in some news outlets. But his time at the Ministry did not go unnoticed, not just because of his 
proposals for radical changes in the country’s economic model but also the concrete actions he took 
during the three short months he served as Finance Minister. The main one was to eliminate a 
stabilisation fund created with surplus oil revenue and transfer these funds to the government 
budget. The measure was widely accepted because it would allow the government to earmark more 
resources for social issues (education and health) but it also held serious consequences for the 
future because it would leave the State unprotected in times of falling oil prices. 
 
Leftist parties and social organisations which had supported Lucio Gutiérrez rallied around Rafael 
Correa during his electoral campaign and he ultimately triumphed in the run-off, even though he 
only came in second in the first round. It is worth noting that in both this election and the previous 
one, the main feature was a widely fragmented electorate: the top two finishers in the first round 
won only a little over 20% of the vote. The decline of the parties that had occupied the centre of the 
national political scene since the return of democracy (Social Christian, Democratic Left and 
Ecuadorean Roldosista) was a determining factor in this scattering of the votes. It helps explain to a 
large extent how the first three finishers in the first round were candidates who had billed 
themselves as alternatives to those parties and to politics as usual. Therefore, the results of the 
presidential election, as well as the legislative voting, can largely be interpreted more as signalling a 
rejection of those parties than support for the newcomers. 
 
Rafael Correa presented a radical-style proposal, which in many circles was identified with the 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. But to a large extent it stemmed from Ecuadorean populism 
that began in the 1930s with Velasco Ibarra. The pillars of his campaign were the fight against 
traditional parties (partidocracia, in his words) and corruption and in favour of the convening of a 
constituent assembly. Therefore it touched on three issues that were extremely sensitive for a 
society that blamed all the country’s problems on the old political class and expected profound 
change, regardless of the of what each sector or even each individual meant by change. 
 
As an expression of that position of total confrontation with the political system, but also because of 
difficulties in coming up with electoral lists, Rafael Correa did not field candidates for the 
legislative elections. The fledgling organisation that formed during the presidential campaign failed 
to come up with the signatures necessary to register candidates and, above all, did not have enough 
people to create such lists. But without a doubt, the underlying issue was the formulation of a clear 
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message rejecting congress, seen as a manifestation of the woes of traditional politics. This was 
expressed in Correa’s call for the cancellation of the legislative voting. From that point on, he 
focused on the idea of a constituent assembly, which would be the only institutional support he had 
in his favour. In this way, a body that had been conceived as the basic tool for carrying out political 
reform was to become at the same time the guarantor of the survival of his government. This was a 
risky, complicated decision as it could be seen as heralding times even more troubled than those the 
people of Ecuador had endured until then. However, it seems that among voters their disgust with 
politicians and traditional parties won out resoundingly over the search for more peaceful times in 
the world of politics. Also affecting Correa’s decision in a powerful way was the clear lack of 
enthusiasm aroused by the other candidate in the run-off election. 
 
It was in these conditions that Correa won. As stated earlier, the first round triumph went to Álvaro 
Noboa, a multimillionaire who was running for President for the third time. Within the parameters 
established throughout earlier elections and looking at the votes that each of the other candidates 
garnered, Noboa’s margin of victory of four percentage points seemed enough to guarantee him the 
definitive win in the run-off. But the numbers reversed themselves and Correa won with a margin 
of four percentage points. That clear result was interpreted as signally overwhelming support for the 
arguments he had presented during the campaign, especially in the first round, in which his message 
was more strident. The actions he has taken in his first months in government have retained exactly 
this thinking, and allude repeatedly to legitimacy of origin as justifying plans dramatic changes in 
policy. 
 
Indeed, despite repeated announcements of economic reforms, the main thrust in the initial phase of 
Correa’s government has concentrated on politics and in particular the convening of a constituent 
assembly. As such an assembly does not feature in the Ecuadorean legal system –constitutional 
amendments can only be carried out by congress or in a referendum– President Correa called a 
plebiscite to consult with the people on convening such a forum. By sidestepping established 
procedures that require permission from congress, the President triggered an institutional conflict 
that dragged on for nearly three months until he ultimately prevailed. This was possible only when 
the Supreme Court, acting unconstitutionally and illegally, dismissed 57 of the 100 lawmakers that 
comprise the legislature. This not only eliminated the opposition but also added yet another way for 
one branch of power to intervene in another and further eroded the beleaguered rule of law in 
Ecuador. 
 
Thus, the period we have examined ended the same way it started. Violations of the constitution, 
one branch of power intervening in another (or more than one), illegalities, irregularities in 
procedures and generalised political chaos were the main characteristics as this period comes to a 
close. Although the events have assured the holding of the plebiscite and will probably end up in 
the formation of a constituent assembly, there is no sign that the latter will deliver a definitive 
solution to Ecuador’s problems of lack of governability and instability. To the contrary, it is being 
formed in an exclusive rather than inclusive way, and this is the worst option the government could 
have chosen. A constitution drawn up under these conditions will not be recognised by the broad 
sectors that have already been eliminated from the process and by those which will probably meet 
the same fate in coming months. Doubts as to the assembly’s legitimacy abound in many sectors, 
even before the holding of the plebiscite which will decide on convening the assembly. 
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